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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NANUET UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT and 
NANUET TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
#2A - 1/24/84 
Respondents, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6162 
DIANE S. BERGERMAN. 
Charging Party. 
RAYMOND G. KUNTZ, P.C. (RAYMOND G. KUNTZ. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for the Nanuet Union Free School 
District 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (JANIS LEVART BARQUIST. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for the Nanuet Teachers Association 
JAY F. JASON. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Diane S. 
Bergerman to a hearing officer's decision dismissing her 
charge against the Nanuet Union Free School District 
(District) and the Nanuet Teachers Association (Association), 
that the District and the Association collusively deprived 
her of a contractual right to the liquidation of accumulated 
sick leave. The hearing officer determined that the 
Association acted properly when it refused to support 
Bergerman's claim for liquidated sick leave benefits, that 
the District acted correctly in denying Bergerman's claim, 
and that the discussions between the Association and the 
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District did not constitute collusion but rather a legitimate 
effort to discuss and resolve the underlying dispute. 
Bergerman had taught for the District for 23 years but 
was only 46 years old when, in early 1981, she sought to 
receive payment for the 200 days of sick leave that she had 
accumulated. The relevant provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement permits payment for sick leave by any 
teacher who retires with a minimum of 20 years' service in 
the Nanuet School District. Under the State Education Law a 
teacher is not eligible for retirement until reaching age 
55.— Appearing to recognize that, the agreement did not 
authorize her to collect for her accumulated sick leave, she 
asked Stedge. the Association president, if an exception 
could be made on her behalf and he promised to look into the 
matter. 
In June 1981. Bergerman asked Lucanera. the 
newly-elected Association president, to seek a special 
provision for her during the forthcoming negotiations. 
Lucanera responded that, in her opinion, Bergerman might have 
some rights under the existing agreement and agreed to 
explore the matter. After doing so, Lucanera advised 
1/Education Law §§511-a. 533 and 535 are the relevant 
provisions. They permit retirement only at age 55 or 
older, except for teachers with at least 35 years of 
service. 
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Bergerman that she had concluded that the collective 
bargaining agreement was not intended to and did not apply to 
teachers who resigned before the age of 55. Bergerman was 
also advised that the Association would not seek an exception 
on her behalf during negotiations because it felt that the 
taking of such a position would hot be in the interest of 
unit employees generally. 
In March 1982 Bergerman asked Superintendent Mackin 
whether she would be eligible for the sick leave benefit if 
she retired at the end of the 1981-82 school year and he told 
her that she would not. Bergerman then filed a grievance. 
When it was rejected by Mackin, she asked the Association to 
) carry the grievance to the next step, i.e., to the Board of 
Education. The request was considered and rejected by the 
Association's grievance committee and Bergerman was told that 
she might appeal the grievance on her own. 
At about this time. Bergerman learned that an arbitrator 
had ruled that contract language in the nearby Pleasantville 
School District, which was similar to the language in the 
Nanuet contract, permitted payment for sick leave upon the 
resignation of a teacher who was less than 55 years old. The 
decision in that case turned upon the testimony of the 
union's negotiator that the language was intended to cover 
such resignations and that the reference to retirement 
Board - U-6162 -4 
2/ 
contemplated a deferred retirement.— When she called this 
award to the Association's attention. Bergerman was told that 
the negotiating history in Nanuet evidenced a contrary 
intent. She then filed the charge herein. 
The hearing officer wrote to Bergerman's attorney. 
Jason, that the specification against the District was 
defective in that it merely alleged a contract violation and 
that the specification against the Association was defective 
in that it did not allege improper motivation, gross 
negligence or irresponsibility. Bergerman clarified her 
charge to allege improperly motivated and collusive conduct 
and the matter went to a hearing. 
Respondents moved to dismiss the charge after Bergerman 
completed her testimony. Each argued that Bergerman's 
testimony established that it acted reasonably in rejecting 
her claim for payment for sick leave and that there was no 
evidence of improper discussions between them. 
Before ruling on the motion, the hearing officer asked 
Jason for an offer of further proof. While protesting the 
procedure. Jason indicated that Bergerman's husband would be 
called to testify about conversations that he had with 
various representatives of the District and the Association. 
2/Education Law §512-a. entitled "Deferred Retirement", 
authorizes teachers with at least ten years of service who 
resign before reaching age 55 to receive a reduced pension 
benefit upon reaching age 55. 
5*r 
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The proposed testimony merely corroborated the proposition 
that both the District and the Association were of the 
opinion that Bergerman was not entitled to payment for her 
sick leave and that the Association would not support her 
claim. Jason also indicated that he would call the members 
of the Association's grievance committee, its past and 
present officers and the NYSUT field representative who 
negotiated on behalf of the Association. He indicated that 
he had no idea what their testimony would be, but that he 
would question them about their conversations with each other 
and with the superintendent. 
The hearing officer adjourned the hearing at this point 
and, after receiving briefs from the parties, she granted 
respondents' motion and dismissed the charge. 
In her exceptions. Bergerman argues that the hearing 
officer's handling of the matter was procedurally defective 
and indicative of bias. According to Bergerman. the 
indications of bias are the hearing officer's letter to Jason 
noting the deficiencies in the charge, her refusal to issue 
or enforce subpoenas and her refusal to declare the 
Association personnel subpoenaed by her attorney as hostile 
witnesses. She also claims that the procedure of dismissing 
the charge before the completion of her case was 
inappropriate. Finally, she argues that the hearing officer 
erred in not recognizing that she had a vested interest in 
7: 
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payment for her sick leave which therefore took precedence 
over the interest of other unit employees in the outcome of 
the negotiations then taking place. Thus, according to 
Bergerman, the Association was obligated to press her 
interests even if it would complicate the negotiations and 
compromise the interests of other unit employees. 
None of these arguments is persuasive. The record 
reflects no bias on the part of the hearing officer. The 
deficiency letter, which was sent as a matter of routine, was 
accurate and appropriate. The hearing officer refused to 
issue a subpoena because Bergerman's attorney was empowered 
by law to do so himself. This, too, is routine and 
appropriate procedure. Neither is there any merit in 
Bergerman's allegation that the hearing officer refused to 
enforce the subpoenas. When asked by Jason to direct 
witnesses subpoenaed by him to attend adjourned sessions of 
the hearing, she responded that she did not have authority to 
do so. She added, however, that any further hearing dates 
should be considered to be in continuation of the hearing for 
which the subpoenas were originally issued. Clearly, this 
does not reflect any bias against Bergerman. 
Finally. Bergerman argues that the hearing officer 
demonstrated bias by refusing to rule that the witnesses her 
attorney subpoenaed were hostile witnesses merely because 
they were Association officers. It was also proper for the 
hearing officer to indicate that she would rule on 
m 
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Bergerman's claim, that the witnesses should be declared 
hostile, after she observed each witness' demeanor when 
testifying. 
The hearing officer's request for an offer of proof was 
3/ 
appropriate.- So was her conclusion that the proposed 
further testimony would not establish a prima facie case. 
The proposed testimony of Mr. Bergerman added nothing and as 
attorney Jason admittedly had no idea what the testimony of 
the other witnesses might be. the hearing officer correctly 
found he was engaged in a "fishing expedition". A 
continuation of the hearing at that point would have been an 
unnecessary burden upon respondents, as it would be for this 
J Board. 
Finally. Bergerman's argument that she had a "vested 
right" to the liquidated sick leave is without substance. 
Her alleged right would not vest until she reached age 55. 
On the record before us. we find that the Association gave 
measured consideration to Bergerman's request that the 
Association negotiate a special benefit for her and that it 
support her grievance, and its conclusion not to support her 
request was reasonably arrived at. 
2/see Village of Spring Valley PBA. 14 PERB ipoio 
(1981). 
;?60 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24. 1984 
New York. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Sfar. /C^U^^ 
Ida J C l a u s . Member 
ST™ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2B - 1/24/84 
THE CITY OF BATAVIA FIREFIGHTERS. 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
FIREFIGHTERS. LOCAL 896. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-68 50 
CITY OF BATAVIA, 
Charging Party. 
HOVEY & MASSARO. ESQS. (ANGELO MASSARO. ESQ., and 
THOMAS J. CASERTA. JR.. ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
HARTER. SECREST & EMERY. ESQS. (BARRY R. WHITMAN. 
ESQ., and SUE A. JACOBSON. ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
of Batavia (City) to a hearing officer's decision 
dismissing two of three specifications of its charge 
against the City of Batavia Firefighters, International 
Association of Firefighters, Local 896 (Local 896). The 
charge alleges that Local 896 violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law by submitting a petition for interest 
arbitration pursuant to §209.4 of such law covering three 
Board - U-6850 
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nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. It further argues 
that Local 896 acted improperly because the subject matter 
of the petition for arbitration covers matters in the 
parties' expired agreement, and the enactment of 
§2p?-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law prevents it from implementing 
an eventual arbitration award.-
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer that the 
enactment of §209-a.l(e), which declares it improper for a 
public employer to refuse to continue the terms of an 
expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated, does 
not make the filing of a petition for interest arbitration 
as to such terms improper. The problem for the employer 
would arise, if at all. only when the employer actually 
altered the terms of an expired agreement pursuant to such 
an arbitration award. A majority of this Board addressed 
this issue in a footnote in Niagara County Legislature. 16 
PERB 1f307l (1983). and stated that an employee organization 
waives its right to complain under §209-a.l(e) when it 
consents to a determination by a public arbitration panel 
or by a legislative body. While the dissenting opinion in 
Niagara County Legislature does not accept the reasoning of 
I/Local 896 did not except to the hearing officer's 
determination that one of the matters submitted to 
interest arbitration was nonmandatory. 
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the footnote, it is even more directly supportive of the 
propriety of Local 896's action in filing the petition. 
The dissenting opinion is that the improper practice 
created by §209-a.l(e) does not apply to the impasse 
resolution procedures to resolve a deadlock in negotiations 
pursuant to §209.3(e) of the Law, including the procedure 
for binding arbitration. We therefore hold that the 
authority of an arbitration panel appointed pursuant to 
§209.4. appointed pursuant to Local 896's petition, would 
not be diminished by the provisions of §209-a.l(e). 
The first specific demand challenged by the City as 
nonmandatory is for the 20-year retirement plan authorized 
by the State Retirement and Social Security Law §384-d 
relating to firefighters and policemen. The City's 
argument is that this plan is unconstitutional in that it 
conflicts with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967. We rejected this claim in Watervliet PBA, 16 PERB 
1f3026 (1983). saying: 
The authorities cited to us by the City do 
not represent any definitive determination 
that the State law is illegal (footnote 
omitted), and we do not have the authority 
to make such a determination on our own. 
Since our decision in Watervliet. the United States 
Supreme Court has held, in EEOC v. Wyoming. U.S. , 
103 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1054 (1983), that the federal Age 
Board - U-6850 
Discrimination in Employment Act was applicable to the 
states, and it found a Wyoming statute mandating the 
retirement of game wardens at age 55 to be in 
unconstitutional conflict with the federal law. In his 
dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice indicated that the 
majority opinion would have the effect of declaring many 
state statutes unconstitutional, including New York State 
Retirement and Social Security Law §381-b. Relying upon 
this dissenting opinion, the City argues that §384-d is 
also unconstitutional. 
That decision is not a definitive determination on 
the issue before us. There is a significant factual 
difference between the Wyoming statute and §384-d of the 
New York Retirement, and Social Security Law, the statute 
challenged here. The Wyoming statute imposed involuntary 
retirement while §384-d merely authorizes the retirement 
of firefighters and policemen after 20 years service or 
at age 62. Under §384-d, the individual must elect to 
participate in the plan and may revoke that election. 
Moreover, the dissenting opinion in EEOC v. Wyoming is 
not controlling as to the constitutional status of 
Board - U-6850 -5 
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§381-b. We therefore find our analysis in Watervliet 
PBA to remain applicable and unaffected by EEOC v. Wyoming. 
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer's decision that 
Local 896's demand for the benefits made available by §384-d 
is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
The City's remaining challenge is to a compensation 
demand relating to out-of-title work. It provides: "Out of 
Title Work: . . . Acting-Officers should be paid at top 
grade." The City argues that since officers are not unit 
employees, the salaries of firefighters working as acting 
officers is also beyond the negotiating reach of Local 896. 
As the record stipulations of fact do not show the duration 
or regularity of the out-of-title work of the unit 
employees, we cannot find that acting officers have ceased 
to be unit employees. Accordingly, we affirm the decision 
of the hearing officer that the demand is "for premium pay 
for unit employees engaged in a special assignment [and 
3/ therefore] a mandatory subject of negotiation."— 
I/The constitutionality of that law is now being 
challenged in an action brought by the EEOC against 
New York State. The State is arguing that, for the police 
employment covered by §381-b. mandatory retirement at age 
55 is a bona fide occupational qualification. If 
established, this proposition would be a defense to the 
EEOC's lawsuit. 
3/See City of Yonkers. 10 PERB 1f3056 (1977). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, 
and they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1984 
New York, New York 
^^e^/^/^ /-€k^>-m~G-*n 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klausy Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
.
 #2C _ 1/24/84 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC.. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6878 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS C. BARRY. p_ro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Thomas C. 
Barry to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his charge 
against United University Professions. Inc. (UUP) on the 
ground that the facts as alleged do not. as a matter of law. 
constitute a violation of the Taylor Law. 
Barry is in the negotiating unit represented by UUP and. 
not being a member of that union, he pays an agency shop fee 
to it pursuant to §208.3(a) of the Taylor Law. His charge 
contains six specifications, all of which relate to a 
"Conference on Academic Unionism" which UUP announced for the 
sr O /t)1 
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fall of 1983. He complains that the conference, which would 
be financed in part by agency shop fee payments, would 
interfere with, restrain and coerce him in his right, to 
refrain from joining or participating in UUP. 
In the first specification of his charge Barry complains 
that UUP is engaged in "sinful and tyrannical" conduct which 
violates his constitutional rights by compelling him to 
support a conference designed to justify trade unionism. The 
Director dismissed this specification on the ground that 
§208.3(a) of the Taylor Law permits UUP to collect an agency 
shop fee from Barry and to spend part of that money in 
support of political and ideological causes so long as it has 
established and maintained a procedure providing for the 
refund to him, upon his demand, of his "pro-rata share of 
expenditures by the organization in aid of activities or 
causes of a political or ideological nature...." 
In his exceptions, Barry argues that the Director 
misinterpreted §208.3(a) of the Taylor Law, which imposes 
upon UUP the obligation to establish and maintain a refund 
procedure as a condition for collecting agency shop fees. 
Barry asserts that the statute neither imposes an obligation 
upon him to utilize that procedure nor precludes him from 
complaining about political or ideological expenditures of 
agency shop fee moneys by UUP in an improper practice 
Board - U-6878 
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charge. We do not agree. Prior to the enactment of 
§208.3(a) in 1977, agency shop fees were barred by §§202 and 
209-a of the Taylor Law. Section 208.3(a) both mandated the 
payment of agency shop fees by certain state employees and 
imposed a restriction on the use by the organization of 
agency shop fee monies for political and ideological 
purposes. It also provided a remedy where agency shop fee 
monies were spent for political and ideological purposes. 
That remedy is the exclusive one afforded by the statute to 
challenge political and ideological expenditures. 
The second specification of Barry's charge complains 
that a refund after UUP has spent part of his money on its 
conference is inherently inadequate because "political power 
once generated and ideologies once promoted by the forced and 
illegal use of my money cannot be recovered and taken back. 
Their evil effect remains." This specification challenges 
the wisdom of §208.3(a) of the Taylor Law in permitting the 
use by the employee organization of the entire agency fee and 
requiring the return of that portion improperly spent only 
after a demand for refund is made. In effect, Barry asks us 
to find that UUP committed an improper practice when it 
followed the statutory procedure. This we are not authorized 
to do. As we have stated, the refund procedure is the only 
remedy provided by the statute. 
* 8770 
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Barry's third specification is that the refund procedure 
established and maintained by UUP is legally inadequate 
because it is inherently unfair in that, all its steps are 
under the control of UUP. As noted by the Director, we have 
already determined that UUP's refund procedure satisfies the 
requirements of §208.3(a).— We have also held that a 
nonmember filing for a refund need not exhaust the appellate 
2/ 
steps of the refund procedure.— Thus, at his own option, 
Barry can commence an action against UUP complaining that his 
refund is inadequate either upon receipt of that refund or 
upon the exhaustion of those appellate steps which Barry 
complains are in the control of UUP. 
The fourth specification of Barry's charge is that UUP 
is, in essence, a political organization "whose chief 
function is to promote the political, social, economic and 
ideological ideals of trade unionism...". Thus, according to 
Barry, the rights that might have been accorded to it by 
§208.3 of the Taylor Law do not apply. We reject this 
argument. UUP. which is the certified representative of 
I/See UUP (Eson). 11 PERB ir3074 (1978). 
1/see UUP (Barry). 13 PERB 1f3090 (1980). conf'd. UUP 
v. Newman. 86 AD2d 734 (3rd Dept. 1982). 15 PERB T7001, 
mot. for lv. app. den. 56 NY2d 504. 15 PERB T7010 (1982) 
771 
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3/ the faculty of the State University,— is an employee 
organization within the definition of §201.5 of the Taylor 
Law and the meaning of §208.3(a) of that law. Accordingly, 
it is entitled to agency shop fee deductions provided that 
it has established and maintained an appropriate refund 
procedure. 
In the fifth specification of his charge, Barry 
complains that UUP's sponsorship of the conference 
compromises his "academic freedom". Whether or not that is 
so is irrelevant to the merits of the charge herein, that the 
holding of such a conference violates §§202 and 209-a.2(a) of 
the Taylor Law. 
The final specification of the charge is that UUP has 
discriminated against Barry and other nonmembers by refusing 
to represent them in actions against itself in connection 
with their complaints regarding the alleged misuse of agency 
shop fee monies. This specification is rejected because an 
employee organization is not obligated to represent unit 
4/ 
employees in proceedings against itself.— 
For the reasons stated herein we affirm the decision of 
the Director dismissing the charge of Thomas C. Barry and all 
its specifications. 
1/see State of New York (State University). 12 PERB 
TT3101.1 (1979). 
i/see East Ramapo Teachers' Association. 11 PERB 
1P036 (1978). 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: January 24. 1984 
New York. New York 
Harold RV Newman. Chairmah 
& * * * & 
Davi 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Mat ter of #2D-l/24/84 
MERRICK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6546 
MERRICK ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS 
AND SUPERVISORS. 
Charging Party. 
COOPER. ENGLANDER & SAPIR, P.C. (ROBERT E. SAPIR, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
PAUL J. DERKASCH. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Merrick Association of Administrators and Supervisors 
(Association) to a hearing officer's decision dismissing its 
charge that /the Merrick Union Free School District 
(District) violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Taylor Law by 
threatening that it would not agree to retroactive wage 
increases because the Association declared impasse. The 
hearing officer determined that the District's raising of 
the retroactivity issue flowed from bona fide negotiation 
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concerns and that it was neither intended to undermine the 
Association nor inconsistent with a sincere desire to reach 
an agreement. 
The parties were negotiating an agreement to succeed 
one that expired on June 30, 1982, with the Association 
concentrating on a salary increase and the District on ten 
productivity proposals. At the fifth negotiation session, 
on December 16, 1982. the Association's spokesman indicated 
that the negotiations appeared to be deadlocked and that 
"he was going to declare impasse." The District's 
spokesman replied that he had no objection to the 
declaration of impasse. He further stated that as the 
passage of time had reduced the benefits that the District 
could realize from the attainment of its productivity 
demands during the current school year, he had questions as 
to whether salary increases should be given retroactively. 
It is this statement which precipitated the charge. 
In support of its exceptions, the Association notes 
that the District's negotiator had expressed no reservation 
about paying a salary increase retroactively until after it 
announced its intention to declare impasse. It asserts 
that its announced intention to declare impasse terminated 
the face-to-face phase of the negotiations and, with it. 
the possibility of either party making new demands. Thus. 
Board - U-6546 
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it contends, the District's raising the issue of 
retroactivity constituted a violation of it's duty to 
negotiate in good faith and a per se violation of §209-a.l(a) 
of the Taylor Law. 
Having considered the Association's argument, we affirm 
the decision of the hearing officer. Neither the announced 
intention of a party to declare impasse nor an actual 
declaration of impasse terminates negotiations in the sense 
that it precludes a party from making new demands. "The term 
'negotiations' under the Taylor Law contemplates not only 
face-to-face bargaining, but the full range of conciliation 
procedures under CSL §209 . . . ." PBA of the City of 
New York. Inc. . 9 PERB ir3013 (1976).-' 
Viewed in a light most favorable to the Association, the 
statement of the District's negotiator might be seen as a 
withdrawal of an earlier partial agreement to make any salary 
increase retroactive to July 1, 1982. While a party's 
withdrawal of a prior partial agreement might be indicative 
of an intention to frustrate the reaching of an agreement, 
there are circumstances where a party's withdrawal of a 
partial agreement may be justified. Peekskill City School 
District. 16 PERB 1F3075 (1983). 
I/See also UFFA. Mount Vernon. 11 PERB 1f3095 (1978). 
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On the record before us, there is a reasonable basis 
for us to conclude that the District was prepared to 
grant some salary increases in return for some 
productivity concessions by the Association and its 
willingness to make the salary increases retroactive to 
July 1, 1982 was a tradeoff for the productivity 
improvements it expected to realize during the school 
year. Thus, as the time consumed by the negotiation 
reduced the current benefit that the District could 
realize from attainment of its productivity demands, it 
was not inconsistent with its duty to negotiate in good 
faith for it to question the retroactivity of the salary 
increases being negotiated. Accordingly, we find no 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. 
We also reject the Association's argument that the 
District's action was inherently destructive of the right 
of unit employees to organize, and therefore a per se 
violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. Finding 
neither a per se violation nor evidence that the 
District's conduct was designed to deprive unit employees 
of such rights, we dismiss the allegation of a violation 
of §209-a.l(a.) of the Taylor Law. 
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NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1984 
New York, New York 
^ ^ f t ^ ^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
%U, AJUueA^ 
Ida K l a u s , Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ULSTER. 
-and-
DONALD SHORT, et al 
- a n d -
#3A - 1/24/84 
Employer . 
CASE NO. C-2666 
Petitioner. 
LOCAL UNION NO. 445. INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS. 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding— having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local Union No. 445. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs. Warehousemen and 
Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit 
1/ The proceeding was instituted by a petition seeking decerti-
fication of the intervenor as negotiating agent. 
Certification - C-2666 page 2 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclu-
sive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations 
and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-
time patrolmen, sergeantsand 
dispatchers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local Union No. 445. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers of America and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit found appropriate, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of. and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: January 24. 1984 
New York, New York 
V£<^-»*t-L 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
. / C ^ ^ - — 
Ida K^aus, Member 
